


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


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CONTENTS


1. USSR: 22nd party congress. (*Page i*)



25X1

5. Mozambique: Portuguese authorities strengthen security forces in northern Mozambique. (*Page v*)
6. Taiwan Strait: Lull in Chinese Communist firing against offshore islands is second longest since 1958. (*Page vi*)

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

21 October 1961

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

USSR: 22nd PARTY CONGRESS

*USSR-China-Albania: The Albanian party's central committee on the evening of 20 October issued a statement bitterly denouncing Khrushchev for his 17 October criticism of the Albanian leadership, and charging that "Nikita Khrushchev and his followers" had "seriously endangered" the unity of the bloc and the international Communist movement by their anti-Marxist actions. Moving to the attack, the Albanians declared their intention, "by means of facts and documents," to place before world public opinion the "truth" about Albanian-Soviet relations which will "unmask the anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian activities of Nikita Khrushchev and his group."

The Albanians appear to be appealing to bloc party members over the heads of their leaders by claiming "we are not alone," and have the support of Communists in the bloc and all the world. The statement predicted there would be a "long and difficult struggle" and defiantly said that the Albanian party and people "will not fall on their knees before the slanderous attacks, blackmail, and pressure of Nikita Khrushchev. . . ." By publishing its counter to Khrushchev as a central committee statement, the Albanian party is affirming its unity behind party leader Hoxha.

The Albanian party's statement specifically took note of Chou En-lai's speech of the previous day. Chou rebuked Khrushchev for bringing the Soviet-Albanian estrangement into full

public view, and admonished that the dispute should be settled privately and bilaterally.

Other Soviet leaders and the heads of foreign Communist parties, nevertheless, subsequently condemned Albania's deviation. In an implicit answer to Chou's contention, Soviet President Brezhnev asserted that "everything necessary was done" by the CPSU, the central committee, and Khrushchev personally to strengthen Soviet-Albanian relations. He added that one way to prevent the "fatal development of events" was for the Albanian leaders to return to the position of internationalism with all socialist countries. Brezhnev's line suggests that the Soviets were determined to bring the dispute to a head. This could be done at a meeting of the Sino-Soviet bloc parties, or possibly all Communist parties, convened at the end of the congress. The Albanian attack would appear to make such a meeting mandatory.

The Albanian response puts the Chinese in the difficult position either of abandoning the Albanians or more openly opposing the Soviet bloc. Prior to Tirana's extreme attack, the Chinese press had reflected Peiping's displeasure with Khrushchev. Peiping's news services ignored the content of Khrushchev's report for two days, and then on 20 October published his condemnation of the Albanian leadership simultaneously with Chou En-lai's 19 October rebuttal. In a further demonstration of opposition to Khrushchev, Peiping continues to publish news items praising Albanian industrial successes and alluding to the Albanian women's congress at which Peiping explicitly reaffirmed its support of the Hoxha regime. [REDACTED]

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*Antiparty Group: Khrushchev's renewed attack on the anti-party group at the current Soviet party congress can be explained in part by the fact that his central committee report covers developments since the last regular party congress in 1956; the abortive attempt to overthrow him in 1957 was perhaps the principal

21 Oct 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

[redacted]

domestic political event of the period. However, similar attacks by lesser ranking party officials at the congress suggest that the real intent is to demonstrate again--and more vividly--how much better off the Soviet people have been under Khrushchev than under Stalin. The attacks are also designed to heap indirect praise on Khrushchev, who prevented a return to Stalinist terror by smashing the group.

It seems doubtful that any members of the antiparty group, who have already been stripped of all responsible party posts, will be brought to trial for their past crimes. It is probable that at least Malenkov and Kaganovich will be deprived of their party cards--their last remaining vestige of respectability.

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21 Oct 61


DAILY BRIEF

iii

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21 Oct 61

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Map Page

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Mozambique: Portuguese authorities, concerned that violence may break out in northern Mozambique after adjacent Tanganyika attains independence on 9 December, are steadily increasing their military strength in the area. Three new airfields, capable of handling C-54 aircraft, are being constructed, and a fourth is being expanded. In addition the Portuguese are building a major military air base in the central part of the province. The military garrison, which a year ago numbered 8,500, of which 5,500 were Africans, now stands at nearly 14,000

21 Oct 61

DAILY BRIEF

v

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as a result of steady troop shipments from Portugal. Most of the white reinforcements have been sent to the north.

About half of the 86,400 troops in the Portuguese Army are now stationed in Angola and Mozambique. [REDACTED]

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(Map)

Taiwan Strait: [Communist China has not shelled the offshore islands since 12 September, the second-longest lull since the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958. The cessation is probably temporary and may reflect Peiping's desire to avoid a display of aggressiveness prior to the forthcoming UN vote on the China representation issue. Chinese Communist propaganda has recently alluded to a belief in Western capitals that intensive shelling of the offshore islands would effectively sabotage Peiping's UN chances.]

N/2

[During the same period, Chinese Nationalist batteries have fired a moderate number of high-explosive shells against the mainland. The Nationalist shelling has been registration and practice firing, intended to maintain morale and combat readiness.] [REDACTED]

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21 Oct 61

DAILY BRIEF

vi

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Portuguese Military Reinforcements in Mozambique

According to the American Consulate General in Lourenco Marques, the Portuguese are building 5,700-foot packed-gravel airstrips at Mueda, Marrupa, and Nova Freixo. In addition, the strip at the military center of Nampula is to be lengthened. Other fields reportedly are planned in other parts of northern Mozambique. At Beira, 500 miles south of Tanganyika, a large base is to be constructed. It will have a reinforced runway of 9,750 feet and will be capable of accommodating the largest jet aircraft.

The situation confronting the Portuguese in northern Mozambique is similar in many respects to that in northern Angola. In both cases the European population is small--the European population of Mozambique is about 100,000, of whom not more than 4,000 live in the two northern districts--and the borders are fairly open. In each case, a single tribe lives on both sides of the border, which facilitates border crossing and affords a safe base for guerrillas. Roads are poor in both areas and are virtually impassible during the rainy season, which lasts from December through February or March in northern Mozambique. Transportation problems have been one of the principal factors hampering Portuguese operations in Angola, and Lisbon's airfield-construction program in Mozambique is doubtless an attempt to cope with these difficulties.

Although Tanganyika Prime Minister Nyerere has indicated that he generally favors an evolutionary process of African political development, he probably will be neither willing nor able to resist demands from his more extreme supporters for action in the emotionally charged issue of Portuguese "colonialism." Nyerere's party already provides assistance to a Mozambique nationalist group, the Mozambique African National Union; moreover, agitators from Tanganyika reportedly fomented disturbances among the Macondes along the border last year. Since

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then Portugal has watched events in Tanganyika with apprehension. [Premier Salazar told Ambassador Finletter recently that he expected an Angolan-type rebellion in Mozambique after Tanganyika's independence.] [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

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Artillery Shelling in the Taiwan Strait

[Except for specific occasions--such as the 85,000 rounds fired on the offshore islands on 17 June 1960 to "protest" President Eisenhower's visit to Taiwan--Chinese Communist shelling has been decreasing since late 1959. There was a 42-day break in the winter of 1960-61, and since then the Communist guns on the mainland have fired only desultorily. Peiping has not formally announced that it is abandoning the practice, started in October 1958, of firing on odd days only, but apparently it no longer regards dropping a few shells every other day as worthwhile psychological warfare.]

[Peiping's desire to stay quiet while the UN is considering the China representation issue may be paramount in the decision to halt the shelling, but the infrequency of Chinese Nationalist firing against the mainland is probably a contributing factor. Since 12 September, the Chinese Nationalist batteries have fired only 154 high-explosive and 227 propaganda rounds. In the past, the Chinese Nationalists have sometimes appeared to use their artillery fire to provoke retaliation.]

[Peiping has not given up on its professed determination to "liberate" Nationalist-held areas. Chinese spokesmen in Peiping, including several military figures, have been giving more emphasis in recent weeks to the "liberate Taiwan" theme than at any time in the past year. However, there is no sense of urgency in their statements. Many of them were made in connection with the 1 and 10 October ceremonies--occasions on which Peiping might be expected to issue such calls. Some have followed denunciations of US policy on Berlin, suggesting the Chinese feel the Berlin situation offers a convenient opportunity for berating the US for its policy toward Taiwan.]

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
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